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Construction Law
by Dennis J. Webb, Jr.*
Justin S. Scott**
Henry L. Balkcom IV*
and
Dana R. Grantham..
This Article surveys construction law decisions handed down by
Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2002, and May 31, 2003. The
cases discussed primarily fall within five categories: (1) contract; (2)
tort; (3) mechanic's and materialman's liens; (4) workers' compensation;
and (5) arbitration. The Article also includes a miscellaneous section
covering noteworthy cases that do not fit neatly into the sections
enumerated above.
I.

CONTRACTS

The Georgia Court of Appeals decided several cases concerning claims
for breach of contract during the survey period. This section includes a
few cases that are not directly related to construction but nevertheless
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deal with general principles of law that contractors, subcontractors, and
material suppliers typically encounter on construction projects.
A.

Government Contracts and Ultra Vires Acts
In Howard v. Brantley County,' the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff County in its
action against the defendant contractor for money had and received
because the County's arrangement with the contractor did not comply
with Georgia's competitive bidding requirements 2 or the requirement
that "all contracts entered into by the county... shall be in writing and
entered on its minutes."3
The Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners negotiated with
the defendant contractor to perform road striping work on certain county
roads. The contractor performed the work and submitted six invoices to
the County in the cumulative sum of $190,600, which the County paid.4
The court of appeals held that the County was entitled to the return of
its payments because the work performed by the contractor should have
been competitively bid upon in accordance with the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 32-4-64.' Contractor argued
that it was excused from the competitive bid requirement because "road
striping is a specialized service under [O.C.G.A. section] 32-4-63(5),
allowing the instant negotiation for its road striping services."6
However, O.C.G.A. section 32-1-3(6) specifically includes road striping
as a form of road construction and, therefore, road striping is not a7
"special service within the meaning of [O.C.G.A. section] 32-4-63(5)."
The court of appeals also found that the voluntary payment doctrine did
not apply "to circumstances in which public funds were illegally paid in
that the contract in issue, had it been written, was ultra vires as beyond
the legal authority of the county to enter."8
B. Environmental Remediation Contract
In Barranco v. Welcome Years, Inc.,' the court of appeals reversed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant-seller of contami-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

260 Ga. App. 330, 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).
Id. at 330, 579 S.E.2d at 758; O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(5) (2001).
260 Ga. App. at 330, 579 S.E.2d at 759 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1 (2000)).
Id.
Id. at 332, 579 S.E.2d at 760-61; O.C.G.A. § 32-4-64 (2001).
260 Ga. App. at 331, 579 S.E.2d at 760; O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(5) (2001).
260 Ga. App. at 331, 579 S.E.2d at 760; O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(b) (2001).
260 Ga. App. at 332, 579 S.E.2d at 760.
260 Ga. App. 456, 579 S.E.2d 866 (2003).
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nated real property because the contract's terms, as interpreted in light
of the parties' conduct, required seller to obtain a "no further action
letter" with respect to the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act ° from
the Environmental Protection Division ("EPD") prior to closing the
sale."
Plaintiff-buyer entered into a contract with seller for the
purchase of certain real estate that contained underground storage
tanks.
The contract, as amended by the parties, contained two
provisions: one dealing with EPD approval under the Georgia Underground Storage Tank Act, 12 the other dealing with EPD approval under
the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act." Each separate provision
referenced
a "no further action letter (or its equivalent) authored by the
EPD. , 4
Seller argued it was only required to obtain one "no further action
letter" from the EPD, which it did." However, the court of appeals
found seller's argument to be without merit because after obtaining an
EPD letter stating that no further action was required for underground
storage tanks, seller continued to engage in communications with the
EPD and the buyer. This evidence showed that seller believed its
requirements for "no further action" letters were not fulfilled." "It is
well settled that 'the construction placed upon a contract by the parties
thereto, as shown by their acts and conduct, is entitled to much weight
and may be conclusive upon them.'" 7
C.

Setoff and Counterclaim

In Long v. Reeves Southeastern Corp.," the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, who
supplied materials to defendant builder.' 9 Builder signed a credit
application and guaranteed payment of any invoices for materials
purchased from supplier. It was undisputed that the materials were
delivered, and the invoices remained unpaid. Builder argued on appeal
that he was entitled to recoup damages from an injury he suffered when
supplier's employee dropped a steel pipe on his foot during a delivery.

10. O.C.G.A. § 12-8-90 (2001).
11. 260 Ga. App. at 464, 579 S.E. 2d at 873.
12. O.C.G.A. § 12-13-1 (2001).
13. 260 Ga. App. at 458, 579 S.E.2d at 869.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 459, 579 S.E.2d at 869.
16. Id. at 460-63, 579 S.E.2d at 870-72.
17. Id. at 460, 579 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting Scruggs v. Purvis, 218 Ga. 40, 42, 126 S.E.2d
208, 209 (1962)).
18. 259 Ga. App. 257, 576 S.E.2d 641 (2003).
19. Id. at 257, 576 S.E.2d at 641-42.
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Furthermore, the builder argued that the supplier breached its duty to
deliver the pipe with care and that there were issues of material fact
regarding the builder's recoupment.2 °
The court of appeals held that the builder was not entitled to
recoupment because the damages for personal injury were incidental to
the contract but did not arise out of the contract. 21 "Recoupment is a
right of the defendant to have a deduction from the amount of the
plaintiff's damages because the plaintiff has not complied with the crosscovenants arising under the contract upon
obligations or independent
22
which suit is brought."
While damages resulting from the plaintiff's breach of a contract sued
on may be set off by plea of recoupment, still this right of set-off is not
broad enough to include damages alleged to have arisen from the
plaintiff's wrongful act in connection with a transaction legally distinct
from the contract sued on, even though closely connected with it in
point of time.23
The court reasoned that the builder's recoupment defense was more
properly characterized as a negligence claim and, barring equitable
could not be asserted as a defense to a breach of contract
considerations,
24
claim.
D.

Home Remodeling and Insurance

In C & F Services, Inc. v. First Southern Bank,25 the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's denial of a home remodeling contractor's motion
for a new trial, holding that the trial court made several erroneous
evidentiary rulings. 26 Homeowner engaged the contractor to repair a
fire-damaged home for $125,000. Contractor had completed almost all
of the work on the home when the parties first disagreed. Homeowner
was funding the home repairs with a joint check from homeowner's
insurance company made payable to the homeowner and his mortgage
company. However, the homeowner forged the mortgage company's
endorsement and deposited the check in his personal account.

20. Id. at 258, 576 S.E.2d at 641.
21. Id. at 258-59, 576 S.E.2d at 642.
22. Id. at 258, 576 S.E.2d at 641 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-7-2 (1982)).
23. Id. at 259, 576 S.E.2d at 642 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Lunsford, 179 Ga. 716, 721,
177 S.E. 727, 730 (1934)).
24. Id., 576 S.E.2d at 641-42.
25. 258 Ga. App. 71, 573 S.E.2d 102 (2002).
26. Id. at 71, 573 S.E.2d at 104.
27. Id. at 71-72, 573 S.E.2d at 104.
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Soon thereafter, the mortgage company threatened homeowner's bank
for negligently depositing a forged check. As a result, the bank agreed
to fund the completion of the home repairs in exchange for the mortgage
company's promise to release the bank from liability resulting from the
bank's negligence in depositing the forged check. Subsequently, the
bank persuaded the contractor to complete the repairs under a new
contract with the bank, assuring the contractor that the bank would
freeze the homeowner's accounts and ensure that the contractor would
get paid. The bank and contractor agreed that the remaining repairs
would be completed for $23,000. The bank made a partial payment of
$13,600, and the contractor submitted its final request for payment after
obtaining a certificate of occupancy. However, upon submission of its
final bill, the contractor learned that the homeowner was allowed to
withdraw the remaining $9400 from the bank, which would have been
used to pay the contractor. The bank refused to pay the contractor and
insisted that it would have to get the money directly from the homeowner. The homeowner refused to pay the contract balance, alleging that
the work was unsatisfactory.2"
Contractor's first lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed after the court
granted partial summary judgment to the bank on the contractor's claim
of conversion and its claims for punitive damages and attorney fees.
After a mistrial in 1998, a new judge presided over the second trial in
2000, during which the bank moved to exclude any evidence of events
that transpired before the contractor and the homeowner signed the
second contract for $23,000. The court overruled the contractor's
objections and, in direct conflict with the pretrial order, precluded
evidence of the forgery of the insurance check, the bank's negligence in
handling the check, the mortgage company's threats against the bank,
and any other communications prior to the second contract. Furthermore, the court refused to allow the contractor's president to explain why
he entered into the second contract. The court also excluded evidence
that the homeowner and the bank failed to provide a "punch list" of
repairs to be performed upon receipt of the certificate of occupancy. The
trial court directed a verdict in favor of the bank on contractor's fraud,
punitive damages, and attorney fees claims. In addition, the trial court
refused to charge the jury on any tort theories and sua sponte directed
a verdict
for defendant's bank and homeowner on the negligence
29
claims.

28.
29.

Id. at 72, 573 S.E.2d at 104-05.
Id. at 73-74, 573 S.E.2d at 105-06.
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The court of appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to admit evidence of events prior to the second contract.30 In
addition, the court found that the trial court erred in refusing to admit
evidence supporting contractor's claims of fraud, negligence, and punitive
damages."

E.

Residential Constructionand Contractor'sAffidavit

In Vintson v. Lichtenberg,32 the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's grant of partial summary judgment to homeowners on the
contractor's claims for extra work.33 Contractor agreed to build a house
for $686,200, but that price did not include the cost of the swimming
pool, tennis court, and fencing. The contract provided that the
contractor would be paid the contract balance, including amounts due on
change orders, upon the substantial completion of contractor's work.34
The contract also provided:
As a condition precedent to final payment, [contractor] shall submit to
[the homeowners] an affidavit in accordance with [O.C.G.A. section] 4414-362 (or other applicable law) stating that all labor, materials and
equipment and other indebtedness connected with the Work for which
the Property might be responsible or encumbered by lien have been
paid in full.35
After moving into the house, the contractor gave the homeowners an
invoice for upgrades and other charges for overages in the amount of
$65,925, which the homeowners paid.3"
Contemporaneously, the
contractor executed the Contractor's Affidavit, stating
That [the] improvements or repairs have been fully completed
according to the terms of the contract therefore ....
That the agreed
price or the reasonable value of the labor, services and materials
incorporated into the improvements or repairs upon the real property
... has been paid. This affidavit is made under the provisions of
[s]ection 44-14-361.2 of the [O.C.G.A.]. 37

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 75, 573 S.E.2d at 106.
Id., 573 S.E.2d at 107.
256 Ga. App. 489, 568 S.E.2d 795 (2002).
Id. at 489, 568 S.E.2d at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 490, 568 S.E.2d at 796.
Id., 568 S.E.2d at 796-97; O.C.G.A. § 36-1-2 (2001).
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Several months later, contractor sent a letter to the homeowners
demanding an additional $55,832.72 for change-order work and extra
items listed in the letter.38
Homeowners moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the
contractor's claim was barred based upon the contractor's affidavit.
Contractor responded with a second affidavit, stating that the first
affidavit was only given to accommodate the homeowners in the closing
of their loan and was not given for the purpose of acknowledging
payment. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the
homeowners on contractor's claim because the statements in contractor's
affidavits were contradictory, and contractor offered no reasonable
explanation for the contradiction.3 9
The court of appeals was not persuaded by the contractor's argument
that he
offered a reasonable explanation for the contradictory affida4°
vits.
As a general rule, if a party offers self-contradictory testimony on a
motion for summary judgment, then the conflicting testimony must be
construed most strongly against the party offering it. Testimony "is
contradictory if one part of the testimony
41 asserts or expresses the
opposite of another part of the testimony.
Contractor testified that the invoice submitted with the affidavit and
the overall financial accounting of the project concerned overages
incurred during construction. Furthermore, the contractor was an
experienced builder who had executed contractor's affidavits in the
past.4 The court found it very unlikely that the contractor would have
remained silent about an additional $54,000 claim merely as an
accommodation to the homeowners. 43 Therefore, contractor's subsequent contradictory affidavit did "not create a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether"" contractor was owed additional money after
executing the first contractor's affidavit.45

38. 256 Ga. App. at 490, 568 S.E.2d at 797.
39. Id. at 490-91, 568 S.E.2d at 797.
40. Id. at 491-92, 568 S.E.2d at 797-98.
41. Id. at 491,568 S.E.2d at 797 (quoting Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256
Ga. 27, 30, 343 S.E.2d 680, 683 (1986)).
42. Id. at 492, 568 S.E.2d at 798.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Waiver of Subrogation

In Colonial PropertiesRealty Ltd. Partnershipv. Louder Construction
Co.,46 the court of appeals decided a case of first impression, holding
that a waiver of subrogation clause in a construction contract remained
in effect after the completion of the project.47 The owner hired the
construction manager to construct an apartment complex. One year
after the complex was completed, one of the buildings was damaged by
fire. Owner's insurance company paid for the loss and brought a
subrogation action against the construction manager, asserting negligent
supervision, negligence per se, gross negligence, and breach of contract.
The trial court granted the construction manager's motion for summary
judgment.'
The parties used the American Institute of Architects' 1992 Construction Manager-Adviser Edition standard form, which provided that the
"Owner and Contractor waive all rights against each other and against
the Construction Manager ...for damages caused by fire or other perils
to the extent covered by property insurance obtained pursuant to this
Paragraph 11.3 or other property insurance applicable to the Work."49
The contract also provided that in the event the owner obtained property
insurance on the completed project, "the Owner shall waive all rights in
accordance with the terms of Subparagraph 11.3.7 for damages caused
50
by fire or other perils covered by this separate property insurance."
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, holding that the
language of the contract clearly provided that the parties agreed to
waive subrogation claims to the extent covered by insurance, even after
the project was completed. 5 ' The court was not persuaded by owner's
argument that the contract provisions were against public policy.52 In
addition, the court of appeals held that the contract language did not
violate O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(b)5 3 because the contract provisions at
issue did not purport to "'indemnify the promisee for damages resulting
from the promissee's negligence'"54 but rather "'shift[ed] the risk of loss

46. 256 Ga. App. 106, 567 S.E.2d 389 (2002).
47. Id. at 109-10, 567 S.E.2d at 392.
48. Id. at 106, 567 S.E.2d at 390.
49. Id. at 107, 567 S.E.2d at 390 (quoting contract, subpara. 11.3.7).
50. Id. (quoting contract, subpara. 11.3.5).
51. Id. at 109, 567 S.E.2d at 391-92.
52. Id. at 111-12, 567 S.E.2d at 393.
53. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (2001).
54. 256 Ga. App. at 111, 567 S.E.2d at 393 (quoting Glazer v. Crescent Wallcoverings,
215 Ga. App. 492, 493, 451 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1994)).
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to the insurance company regardless of which party ... [was] at
fault.'"55
G.

Uniform Commercial Code and Predominant Purpose

Although the facts of Heart of Texas Dodge, Inc. v. Star Coach, LLC56
do not relate directly to construction, the principles of law discussed are
instructive for situations in which subcontractors and suppliers are
supplying products and services for a construction project.
Plaintiff car dealership sued an automobile conversion company for
breach of contract in connection with the conversion of a Dodge Durango
sport utility vehicle into a "Shelby SP 360 custom performance vehicle."57 The car dealership stopped payment on its $15,768 check two
days after receiving the converted vehicle when the car dealership
determined that the workmanship was faulty. This determination was
evidenced by loud noises emanating from the car's front end, the car's
instability, improper exhaust routing, and poor paint quality. The trial
court charged the jury on two provisions from the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"), and the jury returned a verdict for the conversion
company. The car dealership appealed, arguing that the UCC did not
apply because the contract was for services, not for the sale of goods.5"
The court of appeals agreed and reversed the decision of the trial
court, holding that it was error to charge the jury on UCC provisions
because the predominant purpose of the contract was for services and
not the sale of goods.59
When the predominant element of a contract is the sale of goods, the
contract is viewed as a sales contract and the UCC applies, even
though a substantial amount of service is to be rendered in installing
the goods. When, on the other hand, the predominant element of a
contract is the furnishing of services, the contract is viewed as a
service contract and the UCC does not apply. A contract for services
and labor with an incidental furnishing of equipment and materials is
not a transaction involving the sale of goods and is not controlled by
the UCC. 6°

55. Id.
56. 255 Ga. App. 801, 567 S.E.2d 61 (2002).
57. Id. at 801-02, 567 S.E.2d at 62.
58. Id., 567 S.E.2d at 62-64.
59. Id. at 804, 567 S.E.2d at 64.
60. Id. at 802, 567 S.E.2d at 63 (citing J. Lee Gregory, Inc. v. Scandinavian House, 209
Ga. App. 285, 287-88, 433 S.E.2d 687,689 (1993); Crews v. Wall, C.P.A., P.C., 238 Ga. App.
892, 900, 520 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1999)).
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The court of appeals found that the conversion company was in the
business of providing labor and expertise to convert automobiles and was
not in the business of selling automobile parts. 1 Indeed, the car
dealership ordered the conversion parts and shipped the parts to the
Furtherconversion company for its use in converting the vehicle."
more, the car dealership's complaints about the vehicle stemmed
primarily from the labor performed and not the parts used in the
conversion.6 3 The court considered the totality of the circumstances
and was unpersuaded by the conversion company's argument that the
labor accounted for less of the contract price than the parts." The trial
court's error was harmful because the jury was instructed that the car
dealership was obligated to provide the conversion company with a
reasonable opportunity to cure any defects.65 Such obligation does not
exist under the common law of contracts.6 6
H.

Action on CommercialAccount; UCC

In Imex International, Inc. v. Wires Engineering,7 plaintiff-seller
brought several actions against defendant-buyer in connection with the
sale of a diamond wire coating machine and related components. Buyer
contended that it was not obligated to pay because the coating machine
and related materials were defective, and buyer believed that the
contract price was to be negotiated after the delivery of the goods,
consistent with European business customs.6" The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the seller on
each of its counts because the buyer made a partial payment and did not
give a seasonable notice of rejection. 9
Prior to delivery of the wire coating machine, buyer's representative
visited seller's facility and inspected the wire coating machine for three
hours. After delivery, the buyer used the wire coating machine for about
one month, after which it discontinued use because the new machine
appeared to be no better than the buyer's existing machines. However,
buyer waited nearly six months to inform the seller that it was rejecting
the machine. The wire coating machine was delivered C.O.D., which,

61. Id. at 803, 567 S.E.2d at 63.
62. Id., 567 S.E.2d at 63-64.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 804, 567 S.E.2d at 64.
65. Id., 567 S.E.2d at 64-65.
66. Id., 567 S.E.2d at 65.
67. 261 Ga. App. 329, 583 S.E.2d 117 (2003).
68. Id. at 330, 583 S.E.2d at 119-20.
69. Id. at 333-34, 583 S.E.2d at 120-22.
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under O.C.G.A. section 11-2-513(3)(a), denied the buyer the right to
inspect the machine prior to acceptance. 70 Therefore, buyer accepted
the machine on delivery in accordance with O.C.G.A. section 11-2606(1). 7 1 Buyer was not allowed to revoke its acceptance because buyer
did not notify the seller within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovered, or should have discovered, any nonconformity with the wire
coating machine, in accordance with O.C.G.A. section 11-2-608.72
Furthermore, the court of appeals held that the buyer's argument that
the purchase price was in dispute lacked merit because the buyer
received the invoice for $89,000 and failed to object within ten days
73 of
receiving the invoice, as required by O.C.G.A. section 11-2-201(2).
I.

Statute of Limitations for Breach of an Express Warranty

In Feinour v. Ricker Co., 74 the court of appeals held that the six year
statute of limitations applies to a claim for breach of an express
warranty and begins to run "from the date on which the builder
attempted to repair the construction defect covered by the warranty,
which repair was inadequate."7 5 Homeowner filed a breach of an
express warranty claim against the builder of a home constructed with
an exterior insulation and finish system ("EIFS"). The builder gave a
one-year limited warranty on the project, which began to run on
September 30, 1993. The builder was notified of several water leakage
problems during the one year warranty period. On October 3, 1994, the
builder made some temporary cosmetic repairs and represented that the
defect was remedied. Homeowner sued the builder on September 28,
2000. The trial court granted summary judgment to the builder, holding
that the breach of warranty claims expired on September 23, 1999, six
years after the certificate of occupancy was issued.76
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of the breach
of express warranty claim because Georgia courts apply a different
statute of limitations for breach of express warranties than for breaches
of implied warranties and breaches of sale or construction contracts.77
Specifically, the court of appeals cited Georgia cases that held the
statute of limitations runs from the time the express warranty is

70. Id. at 329-34, 583 S.E.2d at 119-22 (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-2-513(3)(a) (2002)).
71. Id. at 334, 583 S.E.2d at 122 (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-2-606(1) (2002)).
72. Id. at 338, 583 S.E.2d at 125 (citing O.C.GA. § 11-2-608 (2002)).
73. Id. at 333, 583 S.E.2d at 121-22 (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(2) (2002)).
74. 255 Ga. App. 651, 566 S.E.2d 396 (2002).
75. Id. at 651-52, 566 S.E.2d at 396.
76. Id. at 652, 566 S.E.2d at 397.
77. Id. at 653, 566 S.E.2d at 397-98.
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breached-the time that the builder abandoned its warranty obligations,
refused to perform, or made inadequate repairs."8 The court reasoned
that the statute of limitations could not have begun to run before the
date on which the builder received notice of the defects because the
builder could not have breached the warranty until after it received
notice.79
J.

Performance Bond and Notice

In Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. of Georgia v.Maritime Trade
Center Builders, ° a subcontractor sued the general contractor for
payment, and the general contractor counterclaimed against the
subcontractor and its surety under a performance bond. The surety
responded, denying liability and asserting as a defense the general
contractor's failure to provide proper notice of the subcontractor's
default, as required by the terms of the bond. The performance bond
required that the general contractor undertake several actions before the
surety's obligations would be triggered. The general contractor sent four
documents to the surety regarding the subcontractor's poor performance,
including statements that the subcontractor was far behind schedule, the
general contractor had to supplement the subcontractor's work, the
subcontractor's superintendent was removed from the job, and the
subcontractor was not paying its bills on the project. The subcontractor
was insisting that the surety pay for the damages suffered by the
general contractor in completing the subcontractor's work."1
The performance bond incorporated the subcontract, which provided
that the contractor could supplement the subcontractor's work after
providing a forty-eight hour notice to the subcontractor. The subcontract
also provided that the surety would pay for losses, damages, expenses,
and attorney fees incurred because of the subcontractor's breach or
failure to perform. 2 The court construed the plain meaning of the
documents and found that "the contractor was not required to give the
surety notice before supplementing the subcontractor's labor or materials
to collect under the performance bond." 3 Therefore, the trial court
properly denied the surety's motion for summary judgment on the issue
of coverage under the performance bond.s'

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 653-54, 566 S.E.2d at 398.
Id. at 655, 566 S.E.2d at 398.
257 Ga. App. 779, 572 S.E.2d 319 (2002).
Id. at 779-80, 572 S.E.2d at 319-21.
Id. at 781, 572 S.E.2d at 321-22.
Id. at 783, 572 S.E.2d at 322.
Id.
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N. Notice to Surety Under Georgia'sLittle Miller Act and Statute of
Limitations
In Southern Electric Supply Co. v. Trend Construction,Inc.,85 plaintiff
electrical supplier sued defendant general contractor for breach of
contract and sued the surety on the payment bond in connection with a
public project.8 6 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment to defendants because the electrical supplier gave
sufficient and timely notice of its claim and, hence, created a genuine
issue of material fact as to the completion date and acceptance date for
the project.8 7
Georgia's Little Miller Act"8 requires a supplier to give "written
notice to the contractor within 90 days from the day on which such
person... furnished the last of the material... for which such claim is
made, stating with substantial accuracy the amount claimed and the
name of the party to whom the material was furnished or supplied.""9
Furthermore, "the writing must inform the prime contractor, expressly
or by implication, that the supplier is looking to the contractor for
payment of the subcontractor's bill."90 The court of appeals held that
the supplier's multiple telephone conversations regarding the outstanding amounts and a faxed copy of the supplier's statement of account on
the project to the general contractor constituted sufficient notice to
recover under the payment bond. 9
"It is not necessary that the writing relied on be signed by the supplier,
and it is sufficient that there exists a writingfrom which, in connection
with oral testimony, it plainly appears that the nature and state of the

indebtedness was brought home to the general contractor. When this
appears[,] the object of the statute,... is attained and the statute is
sufficiently complied with."92
The court of appeals also agreed with the electrical supplier's
argument that issues of material fact remained as to whether the statute

85. 259 Ga. App. 666, 578 S.E.2d 279 (2003).
86. Id. at 667, 578 S.E.2d at 280.
87. Id. at 671, 578 S.E.2d at 282-83.
88. O.C.G.A § 13-10-60 (Supp. 2003).
89. 259 Ga. App. at 668, 578 S.E.2d at 280 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-82-104(b)(1) (2000)
(current version at O.C.G.A. § 13-10-63(a)(1) (Supp. 2003)).
90. Id. (citing Amcon, Inc. v. S. Pipe & Supply, Co., 134 Ga. App. 655, 657, 215 S.E.2d
712, 714 (1975)).
91. Id. at 671, 578 S.E.2d at 281.
92. Id. at 669-70, 578 S.E.2d at 281 (quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Foster
Remodeling Co., 177 Ga. App. 711, 713, 340 S.E.2d 668, 669 (1986)).
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of limitations had run." Specifically, former O.C.G.A. section 36-82105 stated that "no action on payment or performance bonds required by
[O.C.G.A. section] 36-82-101 (public works contracts) may be instituted
'after one year from the completion of the contract and the acceptance
Supplier's
of the ... public work by the proper public authority.'" '
complaint was filed on February 20, 2001, and the project architect
testified that the general contractor's work was not completed until
September 2000."s

II.

TORTS

During the survey period, Georgia appellate courts decided a variety
of tort-related construction cases, including those addressing issues of
agency, Georgia's High-Voltage Safety Act," and termite claims.
A.

Agency

In Enviromediation Services, LLC v. Boatwright," the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant defendants' motions for
directed verdict and upheld the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiffs. 9
Plaintiffs, motor vehicle accident victims and estate representatives of
victims who died in the accident, brought an action against a truck
driver ("Harris"), his employer ("Prince"), a subcontractor that employed
Prince ("Enviromediation"), and the general contractor that employed the
subcontractor ("GBI"), for damages sustained when Harris drove a dump
truck across the center line of Highway 140 and collided with several
vehicles. At trial, Enviromediation moved for directed verdict on the
ground that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that Harris was its employee or agent at the time of the accident, but
the court denied the motion.99
Affirming the trial court's refusal to grant defendant a directed verdict
and upholding the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiffs, the court of
appeals explained that the record contained ample evidence to suggest
that there was at least a factual issue on whether Harris was an agent
of defendant at the time of the accident. 100

93. Id. at 671, 578 S.E.2d at 283.
94. Id. at 672, 578 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Rome
Concrete Pipe Co., 256 Ga. 661, 662-63, 353 S.E.2d 15, 15 (1987)).
95. Id.
96. O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-30 to -40 (1992).
97. 256 Ga. App. 200, 568 S.E.2d 117 (2002).
98. Id. at 203, 568 S.E.2d at 119.
99. Id. at 200-01, 568 S.E.2d at 117-18.
100. Id. at 202, 568 S.E.2d at 118.
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High-Voltage Safety Act101

In Jackson Electric Membership Corp. v. Smith, °2 the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's determination that a
power company ("Jackson EMC") and the utilities protection center
("UPC") were subject to liability under Georgia's High-Voltage Safety Act
("HVSA"). 1°3 The case concerned two construction workers who were
electrocuted when their equipment came into contact with power lines
that were in close proximity to the construction site."°4
On April 18, 1997, in connection with a water pipeline construction
project, the general contractor provided the initial notice to the UPC, as
required by the HVSA, requesting protection from both overhead and
underground power lines. Originally, the work was scheduled to be
completed in two weeks. However, the project was delayed, and the
general contractor again contacted the UPC to request additional
protection from the underground lines. The contractor, however, failed
to request additional protection from the overhead lines. 105
Thereafter, two subcontract construction workers accidentally came
into contact with overhead power lines and were electrocuted. The
parents of the deceased workers brought wrongful death actions against
Jackson EMC and the UPC, alleging both were negligent in the
processing of the requests for protection from overhead power lines in
accordance with the HVSA. The trial court granted defendants' motions
for summary judgment on two grounds. First, the general contractor
failed to submit a "new notice" to UPC, extending its previous request
for protection from overhead power lines. Second, plaintiffs' recovery for
the dangers posed by the power lines
negligence was barred 1because
0 6
were open and obvious.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that
the general contractor was not required to provide any additional notice
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 46-3-34(d) when Jackson EMC did not
comply with O.C.G.A. section 46-3-34(c), which required Jackson EMC
to make arrangements with the general contractor for the completion of
certain safety precautions." 7 Likewise, the court of appeals determined that the trial court erred in its application of the open and

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-30 to -40 (1992).
276 Ga. 208, 576 S.E.2d 878 (2003).
Id. at 208, 567 S.E.2d at 879; O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-30 to -40.
276 Ga. at 209, 576 S.E.2d at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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obvious rule because it could not be said as a matter of law that the
dangers posed by the overhead power lines were open and obvious.' °
Reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the supreme court
explained that the general contractor was required to seek renewal of its
original request for overhead protection after having specifically
represented
that such protection was no longer needed for the pro10 9

ject.

C. Termite Claims
In Economic Exterminators of Savannah, Inc. v. Wheeler,"' the court
of appeals affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of homeowners for losses
sustained as a result of termite damage to their home."' Homeowners
engaged Economic Exterminators of Savannah, Inc. ("Economic") to
inspect their recently purchased home for termite damage. Economic
found termites in the home, treated the infestation, and determined that
the damage associated with the infestation was so minimal that repairs
were unnecessary. Thereafter, the homeowners discovered additional
infestations and reported the discoveries to Economic. After treating the
infestations, Economic issued a new warranty which covered retreatment
of the house, but not the repaired damage. Homeowners filed suit
against Economic to recover losses sustained as a result of the termite
damage, alleging fraud. After a jury trial, the trial court entered
judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Economic appealed, alleging the trial
court erred in entering judgment on a verdict that was excessive and
that included an award of general damages." 2
Affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals noted that the
award of general damages was not improper, and the
verdict was within
13
the range of evidence and not flagrantly excessive.
III.

MECHANIC'S AND MATERIALMAN'S LIENS

During the survey period, Georgia's appellate courts broke no new
ground in the area of mechanic's and materialman's lien law. However,
the courts clarified the law on liens against a landlord's interest and
restated what constitutes proper statutory notice of a materialman's lien
against real property.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. at 210, 576 S.E.2d at 880.
259 Ga. App. 192, 576 S.E.2d 601 (2003).
Id. at 194, 576 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 192-93, 576 S.E.2d at 602-03.
Id. at 193, 576 S.E.2d at 603.
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Lien Against the Property Interest of a Landlord

In Worley v. Cowper Construction Co.,"' a commercial tenant leased
a space in a shopping center. Fourteen years later, the parties expanded
the lease to include adjacent space and executed an amendment to the
lease which obligated the tenant to renovate and remodel the adjacent
premises at its sole cost and expense. The landlord had the right to
review and approve work plans and specifications.115
After the general contractor failed to pay the subcontractor
$112,898.80 for labor and materials, the subcontractor brought an action
seeking a special lien against the landlord's interest in the property.
Because the lease agreement requiring the tenant to pay for the
improvements to the property was undisputed, the trial court granted
the landlord's motion for summary judgment, and the subcontractor
appealed.116
On review, the court of appeals affirmed, noting that under O.C.G.A.
section 44-14-361(b), 117 a materialman's lien may attach to the real
estate for which the labor, services, or materials were furnished only if
they were furnished "'at the instance of the owner' or 'some person
acting for the owner.'" '
The court cited FS. Associates, Ltd. v.
McMichael's Construction Co.,'19 which recognized that a materialman's lien can be enforced against the property interest of the landlord
only to the extent that the tenant was the agent of the landlord in
contracting for the work.120
The court determined that no lien attached to the landlord's property
interest because the tenant was responsible for paying for the improvements to the property, and the tenant acted for its own benefit and not
as the landlord's agent in contracting for the work.1 2' The landlord's
retention of the right to approve plans for the improvements and to

114. 259 Ga. App. 263, 576 S.E.2d 645 (2003).
115. Id. at 263-64, 576 S.E.2d at 646.
116. Id. at 263, 576 S.E.2d at 646.
117. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(b) (2002).
118. 259 Ga. App. at 264, 576 S.E.2d at 646 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(b)).
119. Id. (quoting Meco of Atlanta, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 146,
148, 449 S.E.2d 687, 690 (1994)).
120. Id. (citing F.S. Assoc., Ltd. v. McMichael's Constr. Co., 197 Ga. App. 705,706, 399
S.E.2d 479, 480-81 (1990)).
121. Id. (citing Meco of Atlanta, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 146, 148,
449 S.E.2d 687, 690 (1994) (holding that by contracting for improvements to be made upon
leased premises, tenant does not create basis for imposing materialman's lien against
landlord's interest absent landlord's express or implied consent to contract for improvements)).
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receive additional rent if the tenant's
revenues exceeded a certain
122
amount did not change that result.
B.

Defamation Concerning Land

In Amador v. Thomas,12 a property owner filed a quiet title action
against two materialman's lien claimants. Although the contractor and
subcontractor later cancelled their liens, the owner's claim against them
for defamation of title remained pending, as did the original lien
claimants' counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud. A special
master was appointed pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 23-3-63.124 The
special master conducted a hearing and concluded that the owner held
unrestricted fee simple title to the property and the property was not
subject to either materialman's lien. Over the objection of the contractor
and subcontractor, a court later entered an order adopting the special
master's report. 12 Despite the special master's conclusion, the question of whether the liens had been properly filed was submitted to the
jury, along with questions relating to damages, breach of contract, and
fraud. The jury26returned a verdict in part for the owner and in part for
the contractor.1
On appeal, the contractor argued that the lower court erred by
informing the jury, in response to a question about lien claim notice
rules, that violation of such a rule renders the lien invalid and makes
the claimant liable for damages.'2 7 The court of appeals agreed,
stating that in Georgia "there is no tort for the wrongful filing of a claim
of materialman's or mechanic's lien." 2 ' Instead, "where a materialman's or mechanic's lien is improperly filed, the cause of action, if any,
"
is for defamation concerning land under [O.C.G.A. section] 51_9_11. 129
To successfully recover in a defamation action, plaintiff must allege and
prove that (1) defendant uttered and published the slanderous words; (2)
the words were false; (3) the words were malicious; (4) plaintiff
sustained special damage; and (5) plaintiff possessed an estate in the
property slandered. 3 ° As a result, the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the lower "court erred in instructing the jury that failure

122. Id.
123. 259 Ga. App. 835, 578 S.E.2d 537 (2003).
124. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63 (1982).
125. 259 Ga. App. at 836, 578 S.E.2d at 538-39.
126. Id., 578 S.E.2d at 539.
127. Id. at 837, 578 S.E.2d at 539-40.
128. Id., 578 S.E.2d at 540 (citing Hicks v. McLain's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 209 Ga. App.
191, 192, 433 S.E.2d 114, 115 (1993)).
129. Id. (citing Hicks, 209 Ga. App. at 192, 433 S.E.2d at 115-16).
130. Id. (citing Daniels v. Johnson, 191 Ga. App. 70, 73, 381 S.E.2d 87, 91 (1989)).
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to provide the property owner
with statutory notice renders the lien
"
131
damages.
for
liable
claimant
C.

Defect in the Notice of Lien Claim

In Phillips, Inc. v. Historic Properties of America, LLC,1 3 2 a flooring
subcontractor filed suit against the contractor seeking payment of
amounts owed, and against the owner to perfect its materialman's lien
against the property. The trial court granted a default judgment against
the contractor. The owner filed a motion for summary judgment,
contending that the subcontractor failed to provide it with proper notice
of its lien as required by O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1(a)(2)."3' The
trial court agreed that the notice to the owner, which was sent via
facsimile transmission, was not authorized under the statute, which is
strictly construed and whose language is "mandatory, clear and
unequivocal."" 4 As the court of appeals explained, O.C.G.A. section
44-14-361.1(a)(2) provides in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) To make good the liens specified in paragraphs (1) through (8) of
subsection (a) of Code Section 44-14-361, they must be created and
declared in accordance with the following provisions, and on failure of
any of them the lien shall not be effective or enforceable: ... (2) ... At
the time of filing for record of his claim of lien, the lien claimant shall
send a copy of the claim of lien by registered or certified mail or
statutory overnight delivery to the owner of the property or contractor,
as the agent of the owner.'35
On appeal, the subcontractor argued that because the court previously
allowed, in its view, a "'flexible' construction of the [statutory] notice
requirement,"" 6 the court similarly should permit the subcontractor to
send a copy of the lien by facsimile transmission. The subcontractor also
argued that service via facsimile met or exceeded the statutory
requirements." 7 The court of appeals declined to hold that facsimile
transmission satisfies the statutory notice requirement and agreed with
the trial court "that the inherent unreliability of service via facsimile

131. Id.
132. 260 Ga. App. 886, 581 S.E.2d 389 (2003).
133. Id. at 886, 581 S.E.2d at 389; O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(2) (2002).
134. 260 Ga. App. at 886, 581 S.E.2d at 390.
135. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(2) (2002)).
136. Id. (citing Grubb v. Woodglenn Properties, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 902, 905,470 S.E.2d
455, 458 (1996)) (holding that notice given by personal service of a copy of the lien on
homeowner's wife was sufficient because it exceeded the statutory requirement that notice
be sent by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery).
137. Id. at 887, 581 S.E.2d at 390.
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does not serve the purpose of ensuring that the owner timely receives
notice of a lien."' 38 The court found instructive the supreme court's
analysis in a prior case, which determined that notice sent by facsimile
transmission did not constitute substantial compliance with the statute,
and that a facsimile transmission was not the equivalent of registered
or certified mail."3 9 Noting certain problems inherent with notice sent
by facsimile transmission, such as the inability to determine who
received the notice and if the notice was received by the proper person,
the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the owner based
on the subcontractor's failure to comply strictly with the Georgia
materialman's lien statute. 14
IV.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

During the survey period, the court of appeals issued several decisions
concerning workers' compensation. While such decisions were not
groundbreaking, they do provide a recent discussion of the law.
A.

General Contractoras Statutory Employer

In Reynolds v. McKenzie-Perry Homes, Inc.,14 1 the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the general
contractor in a personal injury action by a subcontractor on the grounds
that the general contractor was entitled to immunity as the statutory
employer.' 4'
Plaintiff Reynolds was employed as an independent
contractor by a plumbing subcontractor in connection with a construction
project for which defendant McKenzie-Perry Homes, Inc. was the
developer and general contractor. After plaintiff was injured in a workrelated accident, Travelers Insurance Company, the plumbing subcontractor's workers' compensation provider, paid weekly wage benefits to
plaintiff under the plumbing subcontractor's workers' compensation
coverage.
Thereafter, plaintiff brought suit against the general
contractor. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that defendant was immune4 from suit as the
statutory employer under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-8(a).' 3
On appeal, plaintiff alleged that the trial court erred in finding that
defendant was entitled to immunity as the statutory employer.'"

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. (citing Clater v. State, 266 Ga. 511, 512-13, 467 S.E.2d 537, 539 (1996)).
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(2) (2002)).
261 Ga. App. 379, 582 S.E.2d 534 (2003).
Id. at 381-82, 582 S.E.2d at 536.
Id. at 379-80, 582 S.E.2d at 534-35; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a) (1998).
261 Ga. App. at 380, 582 S.E.2d at 535.
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Contrary to plaintiff's suggestion that as an independent contractor/soleproprietor plaintiff was providing his own workers' compensation
coverage, the court explained that by failing to obtain his own workers'
compensation coverage, failing to give notice of such election to his own
workers' compensation insurer, and failing to pay an additional premium
to be treated as an employee, plaintiff failed to satisfy the criteria
necessary to establish that he was providing his own workers' compensation coverage.'4 5 Instead, the court indicated that
[w]here an independent contractor/sole-proprietor contracts with his
principal, the subcontractor for the general contractor, for his workers'
compensation coverage to be included under the principal's workers'
compensation coverage and he receives benefits, the general contractorsubdivision developer is deemed to be the statutory employer of the
injured sole-proprietor/independent contractor of the subcontractor.146
Thus, the court concluded that
defendant was immune from tort liability
147
as the statutory employer.
B.

Tort Immunity

In Coker v. Deep South Surplus, Inc.,"4 the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to a safety inspector
because the lower court based its judgment on the safety inspector being
immune from tort liability pursuant to the Workers' Compensation
Act. 4 9 Plaintiff, Coker, an employee of Mayo Company ("Mayo"), was
injured on the job while operating a hydraulic shearing machine.
Plaintiff brought suit against defendant Deep South Surplus of Georgia,
Inc. ("Deep South"), claiming that Deep South negligently performed its
safety inspections of Mayo's facilities prior to the injury. The trial court
granted summary judgment to defendant on the basis that defendant
performed its inspection services pursuant to Mayo's workers' compensation program and consequently was immune from tort liability under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11 of the Workers' Compensation Act. 5 °
On appeal, plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to defendant, claiming that Deep South was not
entitled to immunity under the statute. 5 ' Reversing the trial court's

145. Id. at 381, 582 S.E.2d at 535-36.
146. Id. (citing Sykes v. Smolek Grading, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 633, 634, 420 S.E.2d 85,
87 (1992)).
147. Id. at 381-82, 582 S.E.2d at 536.
148. 258 Ga. App. 755, 574 S.E.2d 815 (2002).
149. Id. at 755, 574 S.E.2d at 816; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1998).
150. 258 Ga. App. at 755, 574 S.E.2d at 816; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.
151. 258 Ga. App. at 755, 574 S.E.2d at 816.
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grant of summary judgment, the court of appeals indicated that because
Deep South was not Mayo's workers' compensation carrier and had no
contract with defendant to provide Mayo with workers' compensation
benefits, defendant did not fall within the ambit of the statute.152 The
court further explained that because the Workers' Compensation Act is
in derogation of the common law, its provisions must be strictly
construed; under such a construction, defendant was but a third party,
with no agreement to provide workers' compensation benefits to Mayo's
injured 153
employees, and thus not entitled to immunity under the
statute.
V.

ARBITRATION

During the survey period, Georgia's appellate courts rendered a
number of decisions relating to arbitration. Although such decisions did
not concern any issues of first impression, the courts did render opinions
regarding the enforcement of a party's agreement to arbitrate, as well as
a party's attempt to vacate or modify an arbitration award.
A.

Waiver of Agreement to Arbitrate

In Moore & Moore Plumbing, Inc. v. Tri-South Contractors, Inc.,154
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision which dismissed
the action without prejudice and ordered the parties to submit to
arbitration.155
Plaintiff Moore & Moore Plumbing, Inc. ("Moore")
entered into a subcontract agreement with Tri-South Contractors, Inc.
("Tri-South"), the general contractor, requiring Moore to perform certain
plumbing work in connection with the construction of an apartment
complex. Moore fell behind schedule and, as provided for in the
subcontract agreement, Tri-South put Moore on notice that Moore had
twenty-four hours to correct the deficiencies. When Moore failed to bring
the project back on schedule, Tri-South provided Moore with a second
notice. Subsequently, Tri-South terminated Moore and hired another
subcontractor to complete
the work. Tri-South refused to pay Moore's
15 6
third draw request.
After being terminated from the job, Moore sent a letter to Tri-South
demanding arbitration to resolve their dispute. Moore then filed an
action against Tri-South, claiming that Moore rescinded the parties'

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 756, 574 S.E.2d at 816-17.
Id., 574 S.E.2d at 817.
256 Ga. App. 58, 567 S.E.2d 697 (2002).
Id. at 58-59, 567 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 59-60, 567 S.E.2d at 698-99.
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subcontract when Tri-South refused to pay its third draw request. TriSouth denied that Moore rescinded the subcontract and asked the court
to compel arbitration. Moore, however, argued that the agreement to
arbitrate was no longer valid because the subcontract had been
the parties to arbitrate
rescinded. The trial court disagreed, ordering
15 7
and dismissing the case without prejudice.
On appeal, Moore contended that the trial court erred by failing to
find that the subcontract was rescinded and in compelling the parties to
arbitrate. 5 ' Affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals
explained that because there was "no evidence that Tri-South operated
outside of the express terms of the contract when it notified Moore of the
problems with the work, withheld money from Moore, and completed the
work through another subcontractor, there was no basis for Moore to
rescind the contract." 59
Similarly, in Wise v. Tidal Construction Co.,160 the court was faced,
once again, with the task of determining the enforceability of a party's
agreement to arbitrate. In Wise the plaintiffs, home purchasers, sued
defendants builder-sellers for negligence, breach of implied warranty,
and breach of contract for damages allegedly sustained as a result of
builder-sellers' construction of plaintiffs' home over a buried wood debris
field. '' One of the defendants answered, stating, "'[t]his matter may
be subject to mandatory binding arbitration pursuant to the contract or
' 162
The
contracts between this [sic] parties and should be dismissed. ,
parties proceeded with the litigation, engaging in extensive discovery
that lasted over sixteen months, after which defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to stay the
proceedings pending arbitration. The trial court granted defendant's
motion to stay the proceedings and compelled arbitration.'
Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal, alleging that the trial court
erred because: (1) the agreement to arbitrate was contained in a "Home
Buyers Warranty Booklet," and plaintiffs did not allege a breach of the
Home Owner's Warranty, thus avoiding the invocation of the mandatory
arbitration clause; (2) defendant waived its right to arbitration by its
conduct throughout the course of the litigation; and (3) the court applied
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), but the parties' disputes did not

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 60, 567 S.E.2d at 699.
Id.
Id. at 61, 567 S.E.2d at 699.
261 Ga. App. 670, 583 S.E.2d 466 (2003).
Id. at 671, 583 S.E.2d at 467.
Id., 583 S.E.2d at 467-68.
Id., 583 S.E.2d at 468.
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involve interstate commerce."M Reversing the trial court's decision
compelling arbitration, the court of appeals determined that although
the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass the parties'
disputes and that the FAA properly applied to the disputes, by
participating in nearly sixteen months of discovery, filing a motion for
summary judgment, and participating in the selection of a jury,
defendant waived its contractual right to arbitration. 6 '
B.

Vacation and Modification of ArbitrationAward

In Henderson v. Millner Developments, LLC,' the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision confirming an arbitration award and
Plaintiff
denying a petition to vacate and modify the award.'
Henderson entered into a "New Construction Purchase and Sale
Agreement" with defendant Millner Developments, LLC ("Millner"),
pursuant to which Millner agreed to construct a new home for plaintiff.
During construction, plaintiff requested that defendant make certain
Subsequently, a dispute arose
changes to the home's design."
changes
and
defendant
sent a letter to plaintiff
concerning the requested
explaining
(1) that it was unilaterally extending the closing date from July 31,
1999, to January 15, 2000, due to the requested changes, (2) that it
would not perform any changes on which it had not already begun
work, and (3) that it would demand arbitration to resolve the parties'
dispute as to the price of the changes.' 69
Thereafter, defendant demanded that plaintiff pay for the requested
changes or defendant would seek another buyer for the property. 7 °
In response, plaintiff demanded arbitration, seeking specific performance of the contract or return of his earnest money deposit. Defendant
filed a counterclaim for the unpaid costs of the changed work and also
sought to recover liquidated damages under the agreement in the
amount of plaintiff's earnest money deposit. After a hearing, the
arbitrator found that defendant breached the agreement by unilaterally
extending the closing date for a period in excess of thirty days (as
permitted by the agreement) and by seeking an alternate purchaser.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 672-75, 583 S.E.2d at 467-70.
Id. at 674, 583 S.E.2d at 469.
259 Ga. App. 709, 578 S.E.2d 289 (2003).
Id. at 709, 578 S.E.2d at 290.
Id.
Id. at 710, 578 S.E.2d at 290.
Id.
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The arbitrator concluded that defendant was not entitled to retain the
earnest money as liquidated damages. In addition, the arbitrator found
that defendant was entitled to its actual damages for the reasonable
value of the changed work plus a fifteen percent markup for profit. 7 '
Henderson petitioned the trial court to vacate or modify the arbitrator's award, alleging the arbitrator overstepped his authority by
awarding Millner actual damages because the contract's liquidated
damages provision provided defendant's sole and exclusive remedy. In
addition, Henderson claimed the award should be modified because the
parties did not submit the issue of actual damages to the arbitrator.1 72
Affirming the trial court's refusal to vacate or modify the award, the
court of appeals explained that "'[olverstepping' like the other grounds
for vacating arbitration awards is very limited in scope . . .[and] has
been described as 'addressing issues not properly before the arbitrator."" 7 Because the liquidated damages clause was not applicable to
the facts presented to the arbitrator, the court of appeals determined
that an award of actual damages was not precluded.174 The court also
concluded that by submitting the change order issue to the arbitrator,
the parties put the issue of the actual costs associated with the change
orders squarely before the arbitrator. 7 '
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

This section discusses cases that share little, thematically speaking,
with the previously discussed topics. Perhaps the one common theme in
this section is that all the cases, at least tangentially, relate to a party's
noncompliance with state laws or county ordinances or both.
A. County Government Building Project Not Subject To City Zoning
Regulations
In Decatur v. DeKalb County,'76 DeKalb County owned a piece of
property in the City of Decatur ("the City") on which it decided to build
the new DeKalb County Courthouse. In the past, the County applied for
building or other permits from the City when constructing within city
limits. This time, however, the County accepted a bid from a contractor

171.
172.
173.
(1998)).
174.
175.
176.

Id., 578 S.E.2d at 290-91.
Id. at 711, 578 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. (quoting Haddon v. Shaheen & Co., 231 Ga. App. 596, 598,499 S.E.2d 693,696
Id. at 712, 578 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. at 173, 578 S.E.2d at 292.
256 Ga. App. 46, 567 S.E.2d 376 (2002).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

to commence
construction on the courthouse before obtaining per177
mits.
In response to threats from the City that it would seek to enforce its
zoning and building ordinances against the County, the County filed a
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, asking
the court to enjoin the City from enforcing these ordinances with respect
to the County's governmental building construction project. 178 The
trial court heard the matter and noted that because
(1) all of the ordinances that would necessarily apply to the construction projects (i.e., building codes for plumbing, electrical, heating and
air conditioning, sanitary sewer, storm water drainage, etc.) fell under
the broad category of "zoning," and (2) counties have already been
exempted from municipal zoning regulation of property owned by the
county and used for a governmental purpose .... [that] "as a general
rule . . . municipal ordinances do not control county construction,
where the county is performing an essential function of government
such as the construction, remodeling or modification of a courthouse or
court facilities."179
The court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the County and
permanently enjoined the City "from enforcing its zoning and
building
8
ordinances with respect to the DeKalb County Courthouse." 1
On appeal, the City argued that the trial court erred by ruling that
the City "was without jurisdiction to apply or enforce any of its
municipal ordinances to property of DeKalb County located within the
city and used for governmental purposes." 8' The court affirmed in
part and reversed in part.8 2 It held that "county government building
projects are not subject to city zoning regulations, but that they are
subject to other municipal regulations[,]"' such as building, housing,
plumbing, and electrical codes, and those involving "'[s]torm water and
sewage collection and disposal systems.'"'14

177.
178.
179.
180.
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182.
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184.

Id. at 46-47, 567 S.E.2d
Id. at 47, 567 S.E.2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46, 567 S.E.2d at
Id. at 48, 567 S.E.2d at

at 377.
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377.
378 (quoting GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 3(a)(6)).
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B.

ill

Condemnation;Easement of Access
In Department of Transportationv. Robinson,8 5 plaintiffs purchased
land on a United States highway in Polk County, Georgia, and built an
automotive repair shop. Plaintiffs, under an agreement with the Georgia
Department of Transportation ("DOT"), constructed an acceleration/deceleration lane along the highway for access to and from the
shop's driveway. Plaintiffs later deeded the lane to the DOT.'
In November 2000, the DOT, in connection with a road-widening
project, condemned a permanent slope easement along the entire
frontage of the property and a temporary driveway easement to allow for
reconstruction of the existing driveway. The existing driveway was
approximately nine years old and made of concrete. As part of the
condemnation, the DOT agreed to construct a new concrete driveway in
the same location, but planned to make it six feet wider than the
existing one. The road expansion, however, would eliminate the
acceleration/deceleration lane.'87
Plaintiffs contended that the DOT's elimination of the lane would
interfere with their easement of access to the property. Plaintiffs
testified that eliminating the lane would hinder large trucks from
entering the property and require them to devote more of the property
to a driveway to make such access possible. The DOT claimed its
elimination of the lane was not a taking because plaintiffs did not own
the lane-they dedicated it to the DOT approximately ten years earlier.
The DOT also contended that, because plaintiffs' driveway was being
reconstructed in the same location, plaintiffs could not claim that
elimination of the acceleration/deceleration lane would interfere with
their easement of access." s
Plaintiffs appealed the DOT's condemnation declaration, and the jury
awarded them additional compensation. The trial court denied the
DOT's motion for new trial. On appeal, the DOT asserted that the trial
court erred in denying a motion for a directed verdict.8 9 The court of
appeals disagreed, holding:
The easement of access is a property right, of which the land owner
cannot be deprived upon the ground that the safety of the public
traveling upon the highway may be endangered by the exercise of this
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260 Ga. App. 666, 580 S.E.2d 535 (2003).
Id. at 666, 580 S.E.2d at 536.
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Id. at 666-67, 580 S.E.2d at 536-37.
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easement by the abutting landowner, without just and adequate
compensation being first paid to the owner. While the landowner is not
entitled to access at all points on the boundary between his property
and the public right-of-way, he is entitled to convenient access, and the
existing means of ingress and egress may not be substantially interfered with without compensation. The measure of damages is any
diminution in the market value of the property by reason of such
interference.' 90
The court concluded that the DOT's actions constituted interference
under this rule. 191
"With the acceleration/deceleration lane, the
[plaintiffs'] customers have unimpeded access to the property ....
[I]t
is clear that the existing means of access will be impaired."192
C.

Official Immunity

In Happoldt v. Kutscher,'9' plaintiffs, a motorist and the estate of his
deceased passenger, appealed summary judgments in their personal
injury and wrongful death actions arising from a vehicular collision at
the intersection of a subdivision road and a county road. Plaintiffs
alleged that as their vehicle approached the intersection, its right front
tire dropped off the side of the pavement and into a rut created by
improperly diverted storm-water runoff, causing the vehicle to spin out
of control and collide with another automobile. The driver of plaintiffs'
vehicle was seriously injured, and his passenger was killed. Plaintiffs
sued a Monroe County subdivision review officer, claiming that the
subdivision road that intersected the county road was constructed
improperly, and that the officer failed to inspect and take enforcement
action to ensure compliance with county road construction standards.
Plaintiffs further alleged that the subdivision road was not constructed
or maintained according to the storm-water control measures required
by the county ordinance, that the road did not comply with county
grading requirements, and that the rights-of-way of the subdivision and
county roads were not maintained after construction."
Monroe County's policy required "its subdivision review officer to
inspect subdivision construction sites and to review subdivision plats to

190. Id. at 667, 580 S.E.2d at 537 (quoting DeKalb County v. Glaze, 189 Ga. App. 1,
2, 375 S.E.2d 66, 67-68 (1908); Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114, 116, 97 S.E.2d
300, 302 (1957)).
191. Id., 580 S.E.2d at 538.
192. Id. at 667-68, 580 S.E.2d at 537.
193. 256 Ga. App. 96, 567 S.E.2d 380 (2002).
194. Id. at 96-97, 567 S.E.2d at-381-83.
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ensure compliance with all requirements of the county ordinance. " 19'
The trial court determined that the review officer breached his official
duty to perform those tasks by failing to inspect the subdivision road to
determine compliance with any county ordinance provision other than
the one relating to the right-of-way requirements,
and by not giving his
196
approval to the final plat for the subdivision.
However, the trial court concluded that under the doctrine of official
immunity, the review officer could not be held liable for negligent
performance or nonperformance of those duties because his determination was discretionary in nature. Furthermore, the trial court held that
the review officer had no duty to conduct post-construction inspections. 97
Although the court of appeals determined that the review officer was
not entitled to official immunity from liability resulting from his alleged
failure to ensure that the subdivision road complied with the grading
requirements in the county ordinance because such duty is ministerial,
plaintiffs presented no evidence that proximately linked the washout to
the road's lack of compliance with the grading requirements. 9 8
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary
judgment to the review officer on the issue of proximate
99
cause.1
D.

Theft by Taking

In McMahon v. State, °° a homebuilder appealed his conviction of
theft by taking stemming from his agreement to build a home for a man
and his wife.2° ' The court of appeals affirmed.0 2 Before the couple
became involved, defendant's construction company had a contract to
build a house on a subdivision lot in Gwinnett County. Defendant
obtained a construction loan from a bank, which was secured by the
subdivision lot through a deed to secure debt. When the purchase
contract fell through, the lot sat empty for a number of months.20 3
Subsequently, defendant entered into an agreement with the
aforementioned couple to build a custom home on defendant's lot for

195. Id. at 98-99, 567 S.E.2d at 382-83.
196. Id. at 97-98, 567 S.E.2d at 382-83.
197. Id. at 100, 567 S.E.2d at 383.
198. Id., 567 S.E.2d at 384.
199. Id. at 101, 567 S.E.2d at 384.
200. 258 Ga. App. 512, 574 S.E.2d 548 (2002).
201. Id. at 512, 574 S.E.2d at 549.
202. Id. at 517, 574 S.E.2d at 553.
203. Id. at 512, 574 S.E.2d at 549.
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$295,500. The couple tendered checks totaling $38,000 to reserve the lot
and begin the construction process. The couple agreed to make future
payments in cash, and the purchase contract executed between the
parties established the construction and payment schedule. The parties
agreed the construction would be completed by October 31, 1997, and the
closing date was set for a month later. °4
Unbeknownst to the home buyers, defendant then took an altered copy
of the parties' agreement to the bank to obtain a renewal on his earlier
construction loan. Neither the bank nor the home buyers knew
defendant was receiving money from the other, so defendant was able to
obtain monthly draws on the construction loan from the bank while
simultaneously receiving cash payments for his work from the home
buyers.2 °5
Although construction initially proceeded on schedule, the house
remained incomplete at the closing date. In early January 1998, the
home buyers learned that five subcontractors had placed liens on the
property because they were not being paid. The home buyers then met
with defendant, who acknowledged he was having financial difficulties.
Defendant assured the home buyers that he would finish building the
house within thirty days and take care of all encumbrances, but this
never happened. Ultimately, defendant's construction company failed to
repay its construction loan, and the bank foreclosed on the property in
March 1998. The home buyers bought the property from the bank for
approximately $182,000 and paid an additional $75,000 to complete the
construction. In all, the couple spent over $507,000 to complete their
home.20 6
The State indicted defendant and charged him with multiple counts
of theft by taking. Evidence was presented to show that defendant
unlawfully obtained the home buyers' cash payments because "he knew
and failed to disclose the presence of the first mortgage on the property."20 7 A jury found defendant guilty of seven counts of theft by
taking.0 8 On appeal, his conviction was upheld.20 9
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County Ordinances and Codes
In Carter v. State,21' Fayette County issued a homeowner a building
permit to place a prefabricated residence on a parcel of land that he
owned. After the home was moved to the site, the homeowner installed
a water supply line and requested that the county inspect the line.
When the inspector arrived, he discovered that the line had been
constructed with used PVC pipe and corroded metal couplings with
mismatched threads. After the inspector went back to his office to
investigate whether such materials were authorized for use under the
county plumbing code, the homeowner apparently proceeded to bury the
water supply line. When the inspector returned the following day, the
inspector left the homeowner a notice that the line was rejected for not
meeting code. The county, however, was never called back to reinspect
"'
the water supply line.21
A similar sequence of events transpired concerning the homeowner's
installation of a sewage disposal system. Under the Fayette County
Code,21 2 a homeowner may not bury or use a septic system before the
county conducts a final inspection."' When the county health department inspector arrived to inspect the installation of the septic system,
he discovered evidence that the homeowner had already installed and
buried the system. The homeowner later acknowledged that he had also
installed4 a twenty-five-foot drain field and a "functional temporary
E.

21

toilet."

A third violation was identified after the county engineering department received numerous complaints that the homeowner was clearing
and excavating land on or near a county right-of-way without a land
disturbance permit, causing water to back up onto a neighbor's land and
the right-of-way. Although the county issued a stop-work order
requiring the homeowner to cease all construction on the property and
served the homeowner with citations for violating the county ordinance,
the homeowner continued to excavate the property without obtaining the
required land disturbance permit. 5
Because of the homeowner's conduct and repeated infractions, the
State brought charges against him for violating the county ordinances
and the stop-work order. The homeowner was sentenced to sixty days
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incarceration for each of his five ordinance violations, and fined
$1000.216
On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the conviction,
holding there was sufficient evidence and no reversible error.217

216. Id. at 802, 578 S.E.2d at 511-12.
217. Id. at 798, 578 S.E.2d at 509.

